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think the most common provision is accelerated vesting of founder equity on
exit
Founder vesting is generally to protect the investors and other founders
from one of the founders deciding they aren't into it any more and taking
off with a big slug of equity
The most common form of acceleration is one year, whether single or double trigger, correct? Under your 'quick flip' scenario, if an investor were to exit a two-year old investment then the founder would only earn 75% of his fully-diluted equity (two years of vesting plus one year acceleration).
Is this correct? If so, is the un-vested founder's equity split pro-ratably among all equity holders? That would seem to unduly enrich the investor. How did you handle this with FeedBurner?
Our stock purchase agreement says that basically with any "Change of Control" (merger or dissolution) the Repurchase Right goes away (i.e., we are fully vested). I think it's fairly customary to accelerate all vesting .
It's negotiated a lot.
provisions have acceleration upon exit and it's not normally just one year.
Speaking of FeedBurner, Dick Costolo wrote what I think is the best post on
vesting upon exit that I've ever seen
http://www.burningdoor.com/askthewizard/2007/06...
you bring in a CEO on 50% basis of founder(s), and spread additional 50+% to 5 senior managers?
or does that include options for all employees?
presumably only applies when founders don't remain top managers through exit/IPO, which I guess is the default assumption?
if you had 2 co-founders, bringing CEO in on same basis seems like a good deal for the CEO who is taking far less risk with a VC-backed company.
But a hired CEO will generally get 5-7% of the company if they join early
and less if they join when the business is already ramping and making money
If the entire team is 20%, think 25% to CEO, 75% to rest of mgmt team.
That's everyone include admins
The 20-25% includes all employees, including the ones who are no longer with
the company
Your last question Blaine is really hard to answer
My guess is that many of them are fair, particularly when the founders are
experienced and so are the employees
Inequity results largely from inexperience on the founders part and to a
lesser extent on the employee's part
Is the engineer a co-founder?
Are there engineers on the founding team?
Has there been an angel financing already?
Let's say the 2 co-founders (1 engineer 1 business-type) have just gotten $100k angel and are hiring an engineer. What sort of equity range for that engineer would you expect.
That would be ~0.5% at exit.
Anyway, I now spend most of the time on the other side of the table so 1-2% post seed sounds very reasonable. ;-) Thanks again for a rare insight into a rather elusive subject.
Agreed that the actual split is dependent on experience, and hard to answer. ;-) I was just worried that you were saying that only founders and management were entitled to a non-trivial amount of stock.
part of the cap table. At Facebook, I think it's a significant number.
I hope that Sim's survey asks for dates as well, it will be interesting to see HOW things have changed (if my assumption that they have is even correct)
http://twitter.com/A_F
And don't forget the third category of course, those that won't exit in the near term because they can get profitable and wait, or have a long enough time horizon from founding and enough momentum to make it through.
That assumes that the round is a "proper" one, such that it takes the company to the next big milestone. It implicitly sets the valuation and expectations. Reality can be different, however it's a good model to start with.
Noam Wasserman of Harvard Business School has a database http://founderresearch.blogspot.com/. Many of his contacts appear to be more interested in being "kings" as he puts it.
I distinguish, for students and beginners, between Active Equity Companies which use equity to build a business and Passive Equity Companies which account for >99% of companies formed.
Does anyone know any courses which deal with this equity issue from the point of view of the entrepreneurs/founding team as opposed to the view of VCs on which there is plenty of information.
Very few people who teach entrepreneurship seem to understand the creative tension of building businesses and the emotion of using equity. Marc Andreesson in his interview with Charlie Rose, see you earlier post, touches on the subject and mentions the big difference in valuation between preferred and ordinary shares in Facebook; $15bn to $3bn.
I could go on but this is a comment not a post. I do comment on my blog www.cambridgecluster.com on how companies use or not use equity to build businesses.
I am sure you will make it simple for us!
Everything that is said on this blog is free to distribute via CC license.
I am not aware of any courses on this topic, but HBS does have a pretty deep
case history of startups.
You just need to look at recent events at FB to see the difference between the two. Microsoft bought preference shares at a $15bn valuation, whilst FB itself values its own common stock at around $3.6bn.
Even if the 4-5x difference is excessive, the general point holds.
Since investors generally get preference stock, whilst founders and employees get common, the true dilution is even higher than your numbers suggest, and further reinforces the notion that VC money is, in my view, very expensive.
stock we own is straight 1x no participation. In that case, above the
valuation we paid going in, we share equally with the founder.
1. many companies in our portfolio have built values well above the amount
of preference in their cap structure so in those situations, common and pfd
are essentially identical. The Facebook situation with the MSFT stock is a
bit unusual and I wouldn't focus too much on it.
2. the times when pfd vs common matters is normally a sale/exit where the
investors don't get a very good return.
Certainly entrepreneurs should understand the math around preference. We
build liquidation models for every one of our companies and share them with
the founders and management freely so they understand when and where
preference matters and when it does not.
It's ironic that entrepreneurs (like me) voice our gripes here when you yourself display a level of openness and honesty far above the industry average.
Chapeau!
That said (and before the violin playing starts) I would still argue strongly in favour of all stockholders owning only common. A lot depends on what the founders initially bring to the table, and how much value the VC adds.
In the same way that some people believe a handshake is worth more than a contract, I believe that any multi-owner business should be founded on equality, trust, and a general feeling that if you push the other guy too far he'll moydah ya.
you have one board seat but i control the business
i decide to sell the business for $5mm, i take $4.5mm and you get $500k.
is that fair?
no, it is not
that's why preferred stock exists, plain and simple
What about: founder confers 1m lines of code, patents, trademarks etc and the investor confers some money. Things don't work out and the company gets acquired for less than the investor put in. The investor exerts his 1x preference and keeps all the money.
That's even less fair, especially if the acquirer is purchasing the company for the original code and IP.
There might be some investors who will buy common in an early stage venture they control but I am not one of them
There's a reason that pfd stock exists and its the market standard
Some investors got hosed a long time ago and learned from it
And whilst I disagree with you on the issue of preferred stock, and as I've made clear above, I really respect your willingness to engage the entrepreneurial community - especially on thorny issues such as this.
to understand the other's perspective. So this dialog has been valuable to
us and to everyone who reads it
I know this is a touchy subject and I hesitate to bring it up. But the whole
Sequoia "RIP Good Times" thing was as much about making sure founders cut
back and conserved cash to preserve equity ownerships as it was anything
else. VCs get a bad rap for cramming down and diluting entrepreneurs. And it
will always be the case because it is our capital that causes the dilution.
But most VCs I know, and certainly the best VCs, don't want to see
entrepreneurs get diluted. It's not a zero sum game by any measure and the
ideal is we make money together.
1. Capital is very scarce right now
2. Economic times are uncertain
3. Therefore those with capital (you et all) will require more for your risk profile.
4. That means more equity, more security, more [insert value here]
5. QED existing equity holders will have less.
I think this is perfectly reasonable and in fact correct. And of course, existing shareholders may have less today, but more in the long run. I do believe most VCs (perhaps you are even above and beyond in your enlightenment) realize that capital contributions are not, in and of themselves, value creation. They are simply a means to value creation and that is what entrepreneurs do, so if entrepreneurs have no vested interest, they won't play. So making sure mgmt and founders etc are a piece of the pie is the only way to build value. But my comment stands that I think where as 2 years ago a founder might have kept X, he/she will now end up with .75X. A entrepreneur might be happy at productive at 8% but would prefer 12%, but can not longer keep that much.
I saw it as an oppty to get on my soapbox about VC/founder dilution issues
You may be correct but I am working hard to see that it doesn't have to
happen that way in our companies
Or is it better to ramp up and build a full management / marketing / engineering team along with it's own incorporation etc and sell a developed independent company, even though the newly formed company may take some time to realize a profit?
pay for it.
If you can get a bid, then you can evaluate that against the cost and
dilution of the go it alone approach.
As Philip Baddeley mentioned above, I have built a very rich dataset (thousands of private IT ventures over the last decade) for my research on founders. I've already done some analyses in this realm, but would love to discuss with you what additional analyses might shed light on your questions (and would be fine with your posting the results here if you wanted). Drop me a line if you want to discuss it.
Professor Noam Wasserman
Harvard Business School
I think this is an overly pessimistic assessment
Noam Wasserman, a professor at HBS, has done a lot of research on this
His blog is at http://founderresearch.blogspot.com/
You may find some good info there
Thanks for the link. I have learned quite a few things. Some highlights include: First time Founders provide better returns to VC investors, RIch vs. King is the basic question a founder should ask themselves before raising VC and finding the right VC is the most important thing to do while raising money. It dawned on me that a lot of the tension in the VC - Founder relationship comes from a mismatch. A VC who knows a founder is interested in being a king is dishonest if they invest money with the idea that the founder(or founder team) can be kicked out but make them rich. The VC should just pass on this kind of investment. A Founder(Founding team) is dishonest if they think that a VC will not try to remove them if they are not focused on large monetary returns regardless of what happens to the business. The rare relationship is when the goal of building a great business and a great monetary are shared both by investor and Founder.
Thanks again for providing such a great community.
1. When an investor invests, I believe the implicit agreement is that the entrepreneurs will work to increase the share price AND to execute an exit. In a significant number of exits as much as half of the ultimate value is created during the final transaction (in public companies they call that a control premium, but it's even more significant in private company exits.) If someone who is part of the team leaves before that value is created, I don't think it's fair that they take that value with them.
2. If someone leaves, the board has to find a replacement. If the person leaving doesn't leave some of their equity behind to incentivize their replacement, then all of the other shareholders have to suffer the full dilution effect of their departure (whether it's equity or cash).
I've used this formula in virtually all of my early stage investments for over 15 years. Many of the benefits are psychological and extremely difficult to prove, but I am convinced this formula creates a fundamentally better alignment between founders and early stage investors (especially in this exit environment.)
don't feel comfortable tying that much equity to an exit
But I understand your point