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The first time a management team has to go back to their board and ask for more equity, facing that dilution discussion, they will appreciate the value of having that discussion up front.
Thus said - it's not always discussion about money - it's sometimes making entrepreneur consider things he/she didn't care to think about before.
Fred's post prompted me to create a true pre-money calculator in the startup tool section of FastIgnite.
1. Employees who are granted options after the financing should add value to the post-money valuation of the company. This future value should benefit (or hurt) all shareholders equally.
2. The option pool shuffle creates unnecessary complication. If an investor knows they will insist on reducing share price based upon the option pool, they should ask for the hiring plan up-front and then propose a valuation which takes into account the expected dilution. This allows entrepreneurs to easily compare the proposed offer to other valuations they (or other startups) may be getting.
3. If the option pool gets carved into the pre-money, entrepreneurs have the incentive to create a hiring plan with a smaller pool. If there's a smaller pool, the company is more likely to substitute cash, may become less flexible in hiring, and it will become difficult to reward employees with equity bonuses/raises. That's not a good place for a startup to be in.
4. The best thing an entrepreneur can hear from an investor in regard to this situation is "We're really excited about your company and are going to make a decision about investing soon. Our firm will not play the option shuffle, as others may. What is important to us though is to take a look at your 3-yr hiring plan to find out if we have the same philosophy on equity compensation." If founders / investors do not share the same views on equity comp, that should be discovered (and, if possible, resolved) before the two parties agree to invest and spend time taking about price.
Fred's right that most entrepreneurs don't appreciate the option pool shuffle discussion. The reason is that it feels like an excuse to re-negotiate valuation with the best case being the price you were promised yesterday and the worst case being 15% less than the price you were promised yesterday.
* I'm an entrepreneur so I may be biased.
Options are quite problematic whether from the perspective of having to value their "non cash" GAAP implications or the securities implications. In my view the situation described runs right up to the edge of some of the most dangerous and problematic "dilution" implications of securities law.
All option plans have to be (or at least should be) in writing and must at the very least be "approved" by the Board prior to the first option pursuant to the plan being issued. There should therefore be some thought given to this long before the second round of financing is contemplated. Pollyannish thinking, I concede.
The approved plan should contemplate the implications of dilution on issued and vested or issued and unvested options. There is a simple equity problem here.
The issue of dilution --- of existing option holders --- is most commonly handled in subsequent balance sheet transactions (raising money whether through VC activity or the issuance of common, preferred or some other more exotic security) by the modification of strike prices and the issuance of additional options to compensate for pure arithmetic dilution. One could argue that the manipulation of strike price provisions alone should adequately compensate option holders but that is often not the case.
Public companies have to report earnings on an "as issued" and on a "fully diluted" basis which takes into account, amongst other things, "in the money" but unexercised options as well as other classes of securities which may contribute to "potential" dilution. This calculation is a good discipline for private companies also. It is a kissing cousin of liquidation analysis.
I would further suggest that the issue of stock options as part of a balanced compensation plan incorporating salary, benefits, short term incentives, long term incentives, equity incentives and perquisites for CEOs and CFOs and CIOs, etc., should be addressed in their Employment Agreements and should therefore not be drawn materially into valuation discussions. The compensation cost for a CEO should not be materially impacted by who owns the company and how.
I suggest that this is an area in which a sharp securities lawyer is of more utility than a VC deal guy.
Understanding my thoughts are colored by being a founder/entrepreneur/CEO type, I don't think one can fashion a good management team without allocating at least 10-15% for management plus whatever the founders own.
But that's precisely why both Fred and Mark Pincus agree that "it's a question of valuation." If options come out of post-money, it's a discussion between management and investor about how much of their mutual equity they want to give up to future employees. If it comes out of the pre-money, it is a question of valuation.
sounds like we won't be doing business together which is ok
There are a lot of deals out there
The founder and investors are in traunches, in seniority and then the employee pool will also be a traunche based on the additional value that is created by the company.
Each employee will have shares from the traunche once the founding team and investors are paid (for a liquidity event) at a pre-defind level. The remaining traunches will pay determine the level of profits back to the team.
Frank - in the VC world, would this be blown-up by a A or B round terms? It acts as the same and I assume we could classify the VC firm's equity with a super senior position in one the first traunches?
(a) they made a ton of money from it already (from GOOG etc) and the piece looks small;
(b) they don't think they can make a ton of money from it anymore because exits are smaller (.2% of 50MM after 2-4 years is only 100K ie a bet not worth taking) and the IPO market is way too closed;
(c) there are other opportunities that make cash faster, because liquidation of attention is instant on ad networks for the consumer web
Problem (a) is a particular problem in Silicon Valley with stratified wealth, where the same level of talent maps into very different chunks of wealth, you pretty much have to take the log of someones net worth to know what options to give them. Because of this I think the 5-15% haggling is misplaced -- it doesn't take into account the changes in how consumer web has changed in the last decade.
You can pretend it hasn't with a headcount options spreadsheet, sure, but the realities are that 100K for US people isn't a lot anymore. I think a lot of us are now wanting to get the options math to work *systematically* with equally talented people (with less attitude, more hunger) in India and elsewhere, where 100K IS really life altering. Otherwise, entrepreneurs want to hire entrepreneurial type people here, and that can't be done with "what is .2-.5% of 10% of something like 25-50MM, maybe" math easily anymore. Now the entrepreneur has to attract people because its fun to work together on something, or because its a good education to become a founder.
I think you're getting at a more fundamental issue: Are option pools the appropriate compensation vehicle for employees #3-#20? And the answer will increasingly be "no". If I'm talented enough to be #5 in your company but you're limited to giving me 0.3% - 1.0%, it's not going to work. I'll go and start my own company where I'll be getting at least 10%-30% of the equity for what will amount to approximately equal work to helping you start yours.
I think what needs to happen is that VCs and Founders will have to start expanding option pools or creating larger straight equity reserves in order to get talent that can really launch a start-up. The barriers to entry are falling and keeping an outsized proportion simply for creating a demo around a good idea for a VC is not enough to keep value from the people who actually do the hard work of making the company successful.
I wonder that given the current economy and the growing body of folks who have started companies and lived to tell the tale that the "essential" employee deserving of equity as part of a balanced compensation program is a decreasing number and that the threshold is moving upward.
But that doesn't mean employees shouldn't own a fair piece of the company they go work for
100k is better than nothing
Some points to think about (from an entrepreneurs perspective);
What stage is your business at? Early stage you should not generally need to be bringing in senior management but they are the ones for who the option pool is primarily aimed, so it could be argued that the option pool is not required until you intend to scale the business. Especially if non executive staff understand that options are unlikely to make them rich (and may not even cover their reduction in salary if and when you exit).
Loss of control. I have heard about angels looking for 40% equity at seed stage, then a 20% option pool which would mean effective loss of control for the founders at a very early stage. Whatever the numbers are the option pool is also a further move towards loss of control (am I mistaken?) which is a point I dont think you make here, but for many founders is a key element of any negotiation.
Option pool size. While sizes are often standard I think they can also telegraph some intent (rightly or wrongly). In the case above, a 20% option pool request says to me (planning for the worst) "we intend to bring in a whole new management team to replace you and need significant equity to do that". Perhaps I am being overly cynical there but perhaps not?
If options are there to incentivize staff by giving them a chance to make a significant profit from a good exit then a 5% pool for the senior management could be enough with other staff given a fair salary and great place to work as a good incentive.
If there were unused options in the pool, could the entrepreneur retain granting rights on these on the eve of a sale, i.e. so that they could distribute the remaining value amongst them or their team?
An entrepreneur recently advocated this to me; I told him I thought this would be disputed by the investors (who wouldn't want to be further diluted after winning) and the acquirer (who would likely see this as a strange occurrence and/or want to be involved in setting terms around any "golden handcuffs"*), and he told me that hadn't been his experience.
From your vantage point, would you fight this? Would you expect acquirers to balk?
*Golden Handcuffs might be inside baseball, for anyone reading this who's never heard that, Golden Handcuffs are "a system of financial incentives designed to keep an employee from leaving the company" (wikipedia). Think Stock Options that vest over 3 years or large cash bonuses for staying a certain length of time.
All of those reasons are why it doesn't happen very often
Trust should be reserved for only those things which nobody could ever have contemplated, the balance should be in writing.
The Italians have a saying "Clear pacts, long friendships".
Agree with a handshake, then write it down. Always.
when i started out in tech startups back in the jurassic era (1990) that was pretty damn hard to do... but we did it anyway. (by hiring an attorney who had done a bunch of investment deals and paying him to teach me about the contracts, paragraph by painful paragraph)
but nowadays neophytes can get educated eight wasy from sunday, with a few clicks of the mouse
one huge caveat (with apologies to fred and the scant few others like him who speak on these subjects plainly and sincerely) -- nephytes should NOT look to VCs and professional investors to tell them how they should negotiate or think about finncing terms. you wouldn't ask the seller of a house to manage the house inpsection for you, right? you don't ask the car salesman to decide what car you drive, right? why the heck young entre[preneurs expect investors to give them unbiased views is just impossible for me to fathom. but it happens everyday. i've seen serious accomplished people giving neophytes advice to not consult with attorneys before signing term sheets. WTF!
neophytes: hire a seasoned lawyer. pay him/her for 3-4 hours of their time to be your tutor. there WILL be a quiz!
The option pool should dilute both the investors and Common (the pre-investment founders and employees). Here's why. Investors benefit from the option pool. Why? Because it provides incentive that leads to tangible increases in valuation for everyone, so everyone should take the hit to get the benefit.
There is negative dilution and positive dilution. Negative dilution is when your share is diluted and you don't receive a similar or greater benefit. Positive dilution is when you're diluted but your share increases in value as a result.
Options are positive dilution if they create greater value for the company and thus investors. Further, the full dilutive effect doesn't take place until well after the round is closed, depending on your vesting rules; typically that's a year cliff with monthly vesting thereafter.
If employees receiving options aren't contributing to increasing the value of the company, you typically will drop them, so their options are not allocated or exercised and thus are non-dilutive.
So if you include the option pool in the pre-money valuation, then the valuation should increase, not decrease. Investors benefit from the allocation of options, and should thus be subject to the positive dilution they generally represent.
And now I'm going to play guitar until I drop.
As I see it, the point really is a question of valuation. The question you have to ask yourself as an investor - is just how invested in the success of the company do you want the employees and founders to be. If there's no ownership there - and no prospect of ownership you may get a different outcome relative to the team that feels that it is truly in partnership with you. Thus the balance you describe between price and pool.
I think these are relatively simple things in early stage companies - but get incrementally more complicated as companies grow and need additional rounds of financing. that's where you can set up a real conflict between a new investor coming in who wants to top up a pool of already issued options pre-money, with the existing investors taking all of the dilution, and management taking none of the dilution despite having used up the previously allocated capital. That's where the math and the alignment really gets tricky, because after a certain point, the managers have much more staked on the options than the initial shares - and the incentives start to shift.
As Warren Buffets partner Charlie Munger said in a famous speech at UCLA: " In any given situation, look at the incentives for any of the people involved, and you will likely be able to figure out what is about to happen."
One of the reasons that entrepreneurs do well is that they get to execute on their vision with the minimum of friction from senior management that does not understand the problem as well as they do and wants everything to be concensus driven. The entrepreneur(s) live or die by their decisions - they are owners and have an ownership mentality (and reality) with all of the stress and positives that come with it. A board at its best asks good questions and helps take the thinking up a notch but a VC does not need control to enable that. At its worst, a VC board can end up being just a replacement of the BigCo senior management and the startup slowly but surely starts to emulate a BigCo - just without the BigCo salaries or financial resources.
The board control issue is different than the financial protective provisions that all investors - VC or otherwise - should have before they invest in an early stage company.
round, then the dilution to get to the new number needed will be less than
if there were none
i have seen a situation, disqus, where the pool setup in the seed round was
so large that we actually agreed to keep a portion of it out of the
calculation of pre-money valuation because we knew it would not be used
before the next round
killer post boss. textbook example of blog stars as education providers, and blog-centric communities as schools for ongoing niche education. that's the "wow" moment for me with all this blogging crap, how much i can learn from just spending a few minutes participating in a discussion on a blog.
I was just having the same thought: this is social real-time knowledge production/exchange in motion. This is stunningly powerful example of social education. But who has the UI/ b-model for the conversational wikipedia that would draw this and the 10000 related threads into a searchable and accessible and living textbook?
i'm also a fan of human categorization for these types of sites. i think humans can package things in a way that is designed for learning. i think human classification systems will be better at creating the "living textbook" (nice phrase, i'm going to borrow it :) )
YOU have already hacked education with many of your posts. The content, and frequently the educated discourse which follows in the comments, is a clear hack to traditional B-School deal valuation / compensation system design curricula. I would love to see AVC comments hosted on a Google Wave blip to enable the search-ability and real time collaboration which we are (barely) missing.
Example with 100 shares:
15 shares/options - options pool (15%)
20 shares - investors (20%)
65 shares - founders (65%)
Then let's say only 10 shares are used in the options pool, the remaining 5 aren't used. So effectively we now have
10 - options pool (~10.5%)
20 - investors (~21%)
65 - investors (~68.5%)
Whereas if we had started with just a 10% options pool we would have
10% - options pool
20% - investors
70% - founders
The Math:
At a 5MM exit, you're looking at 525K vs. 625K
At 20MM, it's 2.1MM vs. 2.5MM
At 50MM, it's 5.25MM vs 6.25MM
I like to do these refreshes as part of the financing negotiation since it is all about price
Options: separate some of the value of the business venture for hiring/growing
The shares are set aside for virtual early employees/company owners that emerge as the business grows.
But they also effect the ratio of cash to total business valuation.
So if 10% is put aside for options in a 5mm valuation, and VCs buy in for 1mm for 20% the original owners retain 70% of the company?
In fact, among some regrettable things that Mark says in the video here, he makes the excellent point about the even more important issue of control and his B shares and control of board etc. (he made a similar point at Startup school a few weeks back) http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/11/06/zynga-scam... ). No expectation that you would comment here.
How the pie is split up is important but I agree with Mark that what is even more important is to decide proactively who controls what. In the vast majority of success cases, the founders own enough for it to be a lot of money by all practical considerations. But the entire issue of who made how much is gated by whether the thing was a success in the first place and that is, IMO, mostly impacted by who got to make the decisions about where the company is going. Board members are very important and can add a lot of value - though many add no value or even hurt a company - but only the entrepreneur is close enough to the product and the business to be able to make the final call. Corporate boards did not work for large companies like Citibank - even with "geniuses" like Bob Rubin involved - and if they are the final decision making authority in a startup, they are more often than not going to make the wrong decision.
but your point is valid, which is why i think the super small startups, which we will see more and more of, will need to have larger option pools -- that is their competitive advantage in deals, which they can reap due to their operational efficiencies that enable them to be super lean.
I'd suggest everyone who wants to understand mark watch his recent startup school talk on ustream and then read his blogs posts of the past few days and then watch that video that techcrunch posted again
Context matters when listening
I understand it's just industry convention but the pre vs. post money valuation concepts always seemed funny to me, as if the pre-money valuation was independent from an additional round of capital, when in almost all cases it's contingent on new money.
I'm going to apologize in advance for taking your comment as a jumping off point for an off-topic comment of my own, but I could use some feedback on something from the artistic/marketing-minded folks in the AVC community. Would you mind letting me know what you think of this draft logo for a new blog of mine?
I have a minor issue with the execution of it, but I want to see if others see it the same way I do.
Thanks in advance. If my blog had an options pool, I'd hand them out like Halloween candy to you all.
You write:
"The bottom line is the deal I described leaves the entrepreneur and his/her shareholders with 65% of the company after the financing, the VC investor will own 20%, and there will be an option pool representing 15% of the company that has not been issued yet. The $1mm financing was not 20% dilutive, it was 35% dilutive."
This is only true in the fullness of time. At the moment of signing the deal, in the minds of both the CEO and the VC, 20% of the company has been sold for $1M. The 15% that's been approved but not yet issued is clearly the property of the existing shareholders (I know you weren't addressing that issue, but someone else asked about it), and should remain so.
This is the main reason why I don't like the option pool in the pre-money: it creates a mis-alignment of interests. When it's done that way, the stakes are different when hiring new people. The VC is not getting diluted at all, whereas the existing shareholders are. So there can be pressure to hire that doesn't properly consider dilution. The flip side is also true: management has more incentive to fire someone who may not be working out, whereas the VC is indifferent (equity-wise).
In my (limited, I admit) experience, it's worth working extra hard to find solutions to problems that reduce or eliminate mis-alignment of interests. Every point at which interests are not aligned can (and may well, when times are hard) be the basis for all sorts of trouble, hinders transparency, encourages paranoia, etc. It's just bad news.
Fortunately in this particular case there's an easy solution: let the existing management and the VC be aligned with respect to hiring (and firing). Let them be diluted together, let them make the choices together, etc.
All this has nothing to do with the particular numbers, or with whether people are happy to have the pool, how big it is, etc. It's about getting the dynamics right.
All shareholders (including investors) will be diluted as options are exercised. For example, If a company has 10MM shares, including a 1MM share option pool, and the investor owns 2MM shares, this leaves the entrepreneurs with 7MM.
So the value of the investor's shares 2MM/9MM. With every option granted (assuming it is later exercised) the denominator increases.
It doesn't work that way (in my experience and in what I've read). The investor comes into the deal agreeing to buy 20% of the company for $2M. When the entire option pool is issued & exercised, that's the position they're in. At the moment after signing the deal, the employees own 80% of the company. Over time, as the option plan is used, those original investors are diluted down to owning 70% of the company, the incoming employees grow to own 10% and the investors arrive at their original figure of 20%. So it's the original owners of the company who are diluted along the way by the new hires, and not the investors. That's a big part of why a pre-money option plan is not popular with entrepreneurs. The investors are insisting that the dilution of future hiring is taken out of your hide, and that it's not shared.
investor owns more than 20%, right?
Best,
Tyler Willis
Director of Marketing, Involver
415-683-1742
It's a lot of work to keep track of all this. I once wrote about 6K lines of code to support running a stock option plan, and there were lots and lots of details and special cases.
We all get diluted together
> Your point about being true in the fullness of time is absolutely correct
> and that is why your point about misalignment is wrong
>
> We all get diluted together
It could and should be set up this way, but I think it typically is not. If it were, the entrepreneur's dislike of the pre-money carve out would vanish.
Here's an example.
Suppose that pre-VC funding the company has 70 shares. The company agrees with a VC to sell 20%, with the proviso that a 10% pool of employee options is carved out ahead of the deal. Once the deal is signed, the original team still holds 70 shares, the VC is issued with 20 shares, and the shareholder's agreement allows the board to issue another 10 shares for the pool. If the company is sold one hour later, the VC should logically still own 20% of the company. If the approved but unissued option pool is not regarded as owned by the orginal team, the VCs would own 20 shares out of 90, or 22.2%. That's obviously (to me!) wrong. The math works correctly if those 10 shares are treated as owned by the original team, pending their issuance to future employees.
That way, if the company is sold after an hour, the VCs hold exactly 20%. If the company later hires 1 person who is awarded 1 share (which vests and is exercised), the original team then holds (70 + 9) / (70 + 9 + 1 + 20) = 79%. They have been slightly diluted, down from 80%. The VC holds their 20% all along - they are not diluted by the issuance of the shares in the pool: that's the original reason for carving out the pool ahead of time. When the pool is finally entirely issued (& vested & exercised) there's no need to continue counting the unissued shares as though they were held by the origianl team. The 100 shares are all issued: the VCs hold their 20%, the original team now holds 70%, and the new hires 10%. The math all works very cleanly that way.
To have the VC argue that not only should the company a priori set aside stock for the pool ahead of the financing, but ALSO that the VCs own a proportion of that pool too (which they don't even purchase) is a bit rich! If you're buying 20%, you should be happy with 20% :-)
That's how it *could* be set up. Of course the deal docs can be papered in any way the parties like. But those approved but unissued shares should be on the books somewhere, otherwise the deal is not as it might seem.
Fred - if you don't mind, or even expect, to be diluted along the way with new hires (which IMO is *great*, and the way it should be) then what's the point of carving out an option pool ahead of time? The traditional point of contention with the original team is then removed.
Sorry for such a long comment!
All these details (like keeping track of unissued stock, inequities before the pool is fully issued, interests not being aligned) go away completely if the original team and the VC simply agree that they'll issue stock to new employees as the board sees fit and that new stock will be issued as needed at those times. One way or another, a pre-existing pool of phantom approved but non-yet-existent unissued stock is a mess - it means (until the pool is fully issued) that either the VC got more than they paid for, or that interests will not be fully aligned in hiring/firing.
Apologies if this sounds in any way pedantic or like I'm lecturing. I'm actually trying to learn. Maybe there is a way to avoid these problems with a pre-existing pool, but I don't see how. If I could ask a favor, please use an example with numbers if you reply :-) Thx!
basically - entrepreneur provides a pool of options - if they are not used they share them with the VC.
If you are in the seed stage, and you expect multiple rounds of institutional investment, doesn't in make sense to earmark a budget that covers all expected options needs through multiple rounds. What if I think 30% should be set aside for key hires, employees grants, etc. Is there any reason why I wouldn't want that set aside early? Wouldn't I want to communicate that with seed and Series A investors?
I am just wondering if the option pool negotiated for a given funding round should only cover the expected needs prior to the next funding round, or if a healthy pool should be established early to make the priority/expectation clear.
Thanks for anyone that cares to provide their perspective!
Perhaps we should "carve out" of the investment amount the NPV of the cash comp of all future pals and flunkies of the VCs we are pressured to hire (and all the time spent on bod meetings)? So maybe in a $1mm VC investment the VC would only get "credit" for $750k?
I suggest the employment arrangement with the founder is probably as important or more important than the option pool discussion. The option pool may have some material impact on how the loot is split when the pay window is cracked open but the Employment Agreement and its mix of salary, benefits, perquisites, short term incentives, long term incentives and equity will be at least as important to the ultimate motivation and impact on success.
In the final analysis, the option pool discussion is just a bit of camouflage as to the real pricing of the investment.
I'd love to hear your thoughts at some point, though, on how you like to get to the pre-money valuation, which anchors the whole thing.
I don't remember you ever writing about this so I did a quick search here for "pre-money valuation," and it gave me three posts, including this one.
One of the three was your Geocities post from April of this year and it was as fun to read for a second time as it was the first:
http://www.avc.com/a_vc/2009/04/geocities.html
As you said, it was ride on a rocket ship where, as a reader, it seemed like you had to do a (re)valuation about every fifteen minutes with more and more at stake!
It would be enlightening to know how you, and Woody, and the rest of the folks here approach this particular piece of alchemy.
For others who may be interested, I'll leave links to two useful posts, one written by you in 2004 about valuation and one by Brad Feld, inspired by that post, on valuation algebra:
http://www.avc.com/a_vc/2004/07/valuation.html
http://www.feld.com/wp/archives/2004/07/venture...
These documents are often a pain in the butt to get from the SEC's EDGAR filing system because they are Exhibits to 10Ks and 10Qs and may only be referred to but not really be attached. So this site provides great utility as they catalog them by the purpose of the document.
You cannot imagine the number of such documents which exist. The legal work for these publicly filed documents was done by the largest and best law firms in the country. I must confess to routinely plagiarizing not the actual draftsmanship but the intellectual concepts contained therein. The shear depth of the pool is breathtaking.
The reason I mention it here is that should you find yourself feeling your way along on the provisions of say an Employment Agreement, Non-compete, Option Plan, etc. you can take a FREE look at hundreds of such documents and learn every possible concept employed therein.
It is also an opportunity for an entrepreneur to arm themselves against the proverbial --- "that's the way it is done" kiss off.
Monkey see, monkey do. But, ahh, fear the informed monkey!
Because you are delivering more absolute value per individual unit of stock the delivery of value is increased --- or more likely stays the same --- while the dilutive impact is decreased.
In its simplest application one (1) $1 restricted share is equal in value to two (2) options with a strike price of $0.50/sh.
The recipient receives the same amount of value --- $1 --- while the remaining owners are diluted by a single incremental share rather than two shares,
Restricted stock also provides an opportunity for thoughtful investors to create a liquidity event for management at some interim period while in effect "repurchasing" the long term dilutive impact of the restricted stock.
This is an example of an investor/VC taking a bit longer view of things and bartering short term liquidity for long term reduction of dilution. In effect, a reverse option as it pertains to dilution.
http://www.backtype.com/fredwilson/comment/0000...
Feel free to come back and tell us what you think.
I have never worked at a start-up that the entrepreneur/senior management explains the details with regard to "liquidation preference", "preferred participation", etc. Those details could have huge impact on how employees would be compensated when an exit event takes place.
I wrote a post on my own blog called "Don’t get screwed! Stock option questions you should ask before you join a start-up" (http://www.geekmba360.com/?p=883). And I got quite an opposite reactions from employees vs. entrepreneurs.
I think it's time to call for more transparency in term of VC investment for all parties involved.
Great post and follow-ups. Very educational.
I am co-founder of early stage software company in HongKong and plan to seek VC funding in the New Year so your post very important for us to understand pre/post-money for options pool (we're thinking 10% pool), both social and economic benefits.
When you say ".. enterpreneurs need to find out what the market price for their company ...", how does one "find out the market price" for an early stage company? Isn't "market price" what is finally negotiated between owners and investors?